



**UNIVERSITY
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AI and Cryptography

Lecture 8 – Wrap up and discussion


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
`l.mariot@utwente.nl`

Trieste, June 30, 2023


AI Methods for Symmetric Cryptography



Symmetric ciphers require several low-level primitives, such as:



(a) Pseudorandom Generators



(b) Boolean functions and S-boxes


1	3	4	2	1	4	2	3
4	2	1	3	3	2	4	1
2	4	3	1	4	1	3	2
3	1	2	4	2	3	1	4

1	3	4	2	3
4	2	1	4	3
2	4	1	3	1
3	2	3	2	4


(c) Latin Squares and Orthogonal Arrays

AI approach for symmetric crypto

- ▶ "Traditional" approach: ad-hoc and **algebraic constructions**
- ▶ "AI" approach: support the designer using AI methods:
 - ▶ **Optimization** (Evolutionary algorithms, swarm intelligence...)



- ▶ **Computational models** (cellular automata, neural networks...)




$$\Downarrow F : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$$



**New Direction 1:
Evolve constructions of crypto
primitives**

Evolving Constructions of Boolean functions with GP




- ▶ **Idea:** Do not evolve primitives directly, but rather their mathematical constructions [C22]
- ▶ Use Boolean minimizers to interpret the constructions
- ▶ **Research Question:** Does GP obtain previously known constructions or new ones?

**New Direction 2:
Evolutionary-based
distinguishers**

Differential Cryptanalysis


- ▶ **Idea:** chosen plaintext attack, see how differences propagate to the ciphertext



- ▶ **Goal:** Compute differential probability of $\Delta \rightarrow \Delta^*$
- ▶ **Distinguishing attack:** given (x, x') , classify if it is a *random* or *real* pair
- ▶ **Tool:** Difference Distribution Table (DDT)

Deep learning-based differential distinguishers

- ▶ A. Gohr (CRYPTO 2019): train a CNN as a differential distinguisher
- ▶ Better accuracy than pure distinguishers on SPECK32/64




- ▶ **Problem:** learned models are hardly interpretable!

¹Image credits: A. Benamira et al., *A Deeper Look at Machine Learning-Based Cryptanalysis*, EUROCRYPT 2021

New Direction 2: GP-based distinguishers

- ▶ **Idea:** Replace convolutional layers with convolutional GP [J21]




- ▶ **Research Question:** Is "convolutional" GP able to reach CNN performances, and yield models easier to interpret?

**New Direction 3:
Evolutionary approach to
adversarial examples**

Adversarial Examples in DNN

- ▶ DNN known to be vulnerable to **adversarial examples** (AE)
- ▶ **Idea**: perturb a valid example to mess the DNN's classification



- ▶ Perturbation moves the example beyond the *decision boundary* of a DNN

²Example credits: I.J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, C. Szegedy, *Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples*, ICLR 2015

Evolutionary Construction of AE

- ▶ Perturbations for AE can be **minimal**
- ▶ **One-pixel attack**: Modify just one pixel in a valid example




SHIP
CAR(99.7%)



HORSE
FROG(99.9%)



DEER
AIRPLANE(85.3%)



HORSE
DOG(70.7%)



DOG
CAT(75.5%)



BIRD
FROG(86.5%)


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- ▶ Pixel selection done with **Evolutionary Algorithms**

³Image credit: J. Su et al., *One Pixel Attack for Fooling Deep Neural Networks*. IEEE Trans. Evol. Comput 23(5):828-840 (2019)

New Direction 3: LON Analysis of Loss Landscapes

- ▶ **Idea:** use fitness landscape analysis on the space of AE
- ▶ **Approach:** continuous variant of Local Optima Networks



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Research Questions:

- ▶ Is it possible to improve EA-based one-pixel attacks?
- ▶ Gain insights to build more robust DNN?

⁴Image credit: J. Adair et al., *Local Optima Networks for Continuous Fitness Landscapes*. In: GECCO'21 (Companion), pp.1407-1414. ACM (2019)

Wrapping Up

Other ideas for future work:

- ▶ **Side-channel analysis:** use *neuroevolution* techniques to design DNN for SCA
- ▶ **Private ML (1):** use evolutionary algorithms (EA) to design MPC-friendly activation functions
- ▶ **Private ML (2):** generate "adversarial examples" in MPC-hardened ML models with

In summary: Plenty of open problems, in both directions:

- ▶ AI for cryptography
- ▶ Cryptography for AI

Thank you!

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