## Radboud University

# New Directions in Al-based Cryptography 

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## AI Methods for Symmetric Cryptography



Symmetric ciphers require several low-level primitives, such as:

(a) Pseudorandom Generators

(b) Boolean functions and S-boxes

| 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | | 1 | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 4 | 2 | 4 | 1 |
| 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| 2 | 1 | 4 |  |

(c) Latin Squares and Orthogonal Arrays

## Al approach for symmetric crypto

- "Traditional" approach: ad-hoc and algebraic constructions
- "AI" approach: support the designer using AI methods:
- Optimization (Evolutionary algorithms, swarm intelligence...)

- Computational models (cellular automata, neural networks...)


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| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

## Genetic Algorithms (GA) \& Genetic Programming (GP)

- Black-box optimization of a fitness function [L15]
- Work on a coding of the solutions
- GA Encoding: bitstrings
- GP Encoding: trees



## Use of EA in symmetric cryptography

Design of primitives as combinatorial optimization problems, examples [C21, M22]:

- Boolean functions $f: \mathbb{F}_{2}^{n} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2}$ for stream ciphers

- S-Boxes $F: \mathbb{F}_{2}^{n} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2}^{m}$ for block ciphers

Possible advantages of using EA for this search [P16, M19b]:

- Diversity of solutions, due to the "blindness" of EA
- Flexibility of EA (optimizing several properties at once


## Cellular Automata

- One-dimensional Cellular AutomatA (CA):

Example: $n=6, d=3, f\left(s_{i}, s_{i+1}, s_{i+2}\right)=s_{i} \oplus s_{i+1} \oplus s_{i+2}$


No Boundary CA


Periodic Boundary CA

- Each cell updates its state $s \in\{0,1\}$ by applying a local rule $f:\{0,1\}^{d} \rightarrow\{0,1\}$ to itself and the $d-1$ cells on its right


## Cellular Automata and Cryptography

Goal: investigate how CA can be used in the design of cryptographic primitives [W86, L13]


Why CA?

1. Security from Complexity
2. Efficient Implementation

## Real world CA-Based Crypto: Keçak $\chi$ S-box

- Local rule: $\chi\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)=x_{1} \oplus\left(1 \oplus\left(x_{2} \cdot x_{3}\right)\right)$ (rule 210)
- Invertible for every odd size $n$ of the CA

- Used as a PBCA with $n=5$ in Keccak [B11]


## CA S-boxes found by GP

Idea: evolve a CA rule that defines an S-box, optimizing:

- crypto properties (nonlinearity, differential uniformity) [M19a]
- implementation properties (area, latency)

- Up to size $7 \times 7$ : results on par or slightly better than the state of the art (Keccak, PRESENT, Piccolo, ...) [P17]


## New Direction 1: <br> Evolve constructions of crypto primitives

## Evolving Constructions of Boolean functions with GP

Predefined functions:

| $f_{0}$ | 1001 |
| :--- | :--- |
| $f_{1}$ | 1010 |


| $v_{0}$ | 0101 |
| :--- | :--- |
| $v_{1}$ | 0011 |

- Idea: Do not evolve primitives directly, but rather their mathematical constructions [C22]
- Use Boolean minimizers to interpret the constructions
- Research Question: Does GP obtain previously known constructions or new ones?

Output: | 1010 | 1001 | 0101 | 1001 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  |  |  |

# New Direction 2: <br> Evolutionary-based distinguishers 

## Differential Cryptanalysis

- Idea: chosen plaintext attack, see how differences propagate to the ciphertext

- Goal: Compute differential probability of $\Delta \rightarrow \Delta^{*}$
- Distinguishing attack: given ( $x, x^{\prime}$ ), classify if it is a random or real pair
- Tool: Difference Distribution Table (DDT)


## Deep learning-based differential distinguishers

- A. Gohr (CRYPTO 2019): train a CNN as a differential distinguisher
- Better accuracy than pure distinguishers on SPECK32/64

- Problem: learned models are hardly interpretable!

[^0]
## New Direction 2: GP-based distinguishers

- Idea: Replace convolutional layers with convolutional GP [J21]

- Research Question: Is "convolutional" GP able to reach CNN performances, and yield models easier to interpret?


# New Direction 3: <br> Evolutionary approach to adversarial examples 

## Adversarial Examples in DNN

- DNN known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples (AE)
- Idea: perturb a valid example to mess the DNN's classification


Classification: Panda


Noise perturbation


Classification: Gibbon

- Perturbation moves the example beyond the decision boundary of a DNN

[^1]
## Evolutionary Construction of AE

- Perturbations for AE can be minimal
- One-pixel attack: Modify just one pixel in a valid example

- Pixel selection done with Evolutionary Algorithms

[^2]
## New Direction 2: LON Analysis of Loss Landscapes

- Idea: use fitness landscape analysis on the space of AE
- Approach: continuous variant of Local Optima Networks



## Research Questions:

- Is it possible to improve EA-based one-pixel attacks?
- Gain insights to build more robust DNN?

[^3]
## Summary

## Where we arrived so far:

- Evolutionary algorithms and CA give interesting alternatives for the design of symmetric primitives
- Flexibility of optimization objectives


## Looking at the future:

- Plenty of open problems in the design research thread, but...
... mainly of mathematical interest
- Leverage on the interpretability of evolutionary models for cybersecurity applications


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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Image credits: A. Benamira et al., A Deeper Look at Machine Learning-Based Cryptanalysis, EUROCRYPT 2021

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Example credits: I.J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, C. Szegedy, Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples, ICLR 2015

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ Image credit: J. Su et al., One Pixel Attack for Fooling Deep Neural Networks. IEEE Trans. Evol. Comput 23(5):828-840 (2019)

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ Image credit: J. Adair et al., Local Optima Networks for Continuous Fitness Landscapes. In: GECCO'21 (Companion), pp.1407-1414. ACM (2019)

