





New Directions in AI-based Cryptography

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Dagstuhl Seminar – Intelligent Security 11 October 2022



AI Methods for Symmetric Cryptography



Symmetric ciphers require several low-level primitives, such as:



Al approach for symmetric crypto

- "Traditional" approach: ad-hoc and algebraic constructions
- "AI" approach: support the designer using AI methods:
 - Optimization (Evolutionary algorithms, swarm intelligence...)



Computational models (cellular automata, neural networks...)





Genetic Algorithms (GA) & Genetic Programming (GP)

Black-box optimization of a fitness function [L15]

- Work on a coding of the solutions
- GA Encoding: bitstrings

► GP Encoding: trees

 $f(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) = (x_1 \text{ AND } x_2) \text{ OR } (x_3 \text{ XOR } x_4)$ \downarrow $f(x_1, x_2, x_3) = x_1 \cdot x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$ \downarrow $(x_1, x_2, x_3) = x_1 \cdot x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$

Design of primitives as **combinatorial optimization problems**, examples [C21, M22]:

▶ Boolean functions $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2$ for stream ciphers



▶ S-Boxes $F : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^m$ for block ciphers

Possible advantages of using EA for this search [P16, M19b]:

- Diversity of solutions, due to the "blindness" of EA
- Flexibility of EA (optimizing several properties at once

One-dimensional Cellular AutomatA (CA):

Example: n = 6, d = 3, $f(s_i, s_{i+1}, s_{i+2}) = s_i \oplus s_{i+1} \oplus s_{i+2}$



► Each cell updates its state $s \in \{0, 1\}$ by applying a local rule $f : \{0, 1\}^d \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ to itself and the d - 1 cells on its right

Goal: investigate how CA can be used in the design of cryptographic primitives [W86, L13]



Why CA?

- 1. Security from Complexity
- 2. Efficient Implementation

Real world CA-Based Crypto: Keccak χ S-box

- Local rule: $\chi(x_1, x_2, x_3) = x_1 \oplus (1 \oplus (x_2 \cdot x_3))$ (rule 210)
- Invertible for every odd size n of the CA



Used as a PBCA with n = 5 in Keccak [B11]

CA S-boxes found by GP

Idea: evolve a CA rule that defines an S-box, optimizing:

- crypto properties (nonlinearity, differential uniformity) [M19a]
- implementation properties (area, latency)



Up to size 7×7: results on par or slightly better than the state of the art (Keccak, PRESENT, Piccolo, ...) [P17]

New Direction 1: Evolve constructions of crypto primitives

Evolving Constructions of Boolean functions with GP



- Idea: Do not evolve primitives directly, but rather their mathematical constructions [C22]
- Use Boolean minimizers to interpret the constructions
- Research Question: Does GP obtain previously known constructions or new ones?

New Direction 2: Evolutionary-based distinguishers

Differential Cryptanalysis

Idea: chosen plaintext attack, see how differences propagate to the ciphertext



- ► **Goal**: Compute differential probability of $\Delta \rightarrow \Delta^*$
- Distinguishing attack: given (x, x'), classify if it is a random or real pair
- Tool: Difference Distribution Table (DDT)

Deep learning-based differential distinguishers

- A. Gohr (CRYPTO 2019): train a CNN as a differential distinguisher
- Better accuracy than pure distinguishers on SPECK32/64



Problem: learned models are hardly interpretable!

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¹Image credits: A. Benamira et al., A Deeper Look at Machine Learning-Based Cryptanalysis, EUROCRYPT 2021

New Direction 2: GP-based distinguishers

Idea: Replace convolutional layers with convolutional GP [J21]



Research Question: Is "convolutional" GP able to reach CNN performances, and yield models easier to interpret?

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New Direction 3: Evolutionary approach to adversarial examples

Adversarial Examples in DNN

- DNN known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples (AE)
- Idea: perturb a valid example to mess the DNN's classification



Classification: Panda

Noise perturbation

Classification: Gibbon

Perturbation moves the example beyond the decision boundary of a DNN

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²Example credits: I.J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, C. Szegedy, *Explaining and Harnessing* Adversarial Examples, ICLR 2015

Evolutionary Construction of AE

- Perturbations for AE can be minimal
- One-pixel attack: Modify just one pixel in a valid example



Pixel selection done with Evolutionary Algorithms

³Image credit: J. Su et al., *One Pixel Attack for Fooling Deep Neural Networks*. IEEE Trans. Evol. Comput 23(5):828-840 (2019)

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New Direction 2: LON Analysis of Loss Landscapes

- Idea: use fitness landscape analysis on the space of AE
- Approach: continuous variant of Local Optima Networks



Research Questions:

- Is it possible to improve EA-based one-pixel attacks?
- Gain insights to build more robust DNN?

⁴Image credit: J. Adair et al., *Local Optima Networks for Continuous Fitness Landscapes*. In: GECCO'21 (Companion), pp.1407-1414. ACM (2019)

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Where we arrived so far:

- Evolutionary algorithms and CA give interesting alternatives for the design of symmetric primitives
- Flexibility of optimization objectives

Looking at the future:

- Plenty of open problems in the design research thread, but... ... mainly of mathematical interest
- Leverage on the interpretability of evolutionary models for cybersecurity applications

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