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Synergies between AI and Cryptography

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What does AI have to do with Cryptography?

Machine Learning & Cryptography (Rivest, 1991)

Cryptography and Machine Learning

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Abstract

This paper gives a survey of the relationship between the fields of cryptography and machine learning, with an emphasis on how each field has contributed ideas and techniques to the other. Some suggested directions for future cross-fertilization are also proposed.

1 Introduction

The field of computer science biosensed in the 1947 and 50°, following some theoretical development of the 100°. From the hepitality, both cryptography and machine learning were isistantly associated with this zere technology. Cryptography Jayad a major relation in the course of WerkWW III, is also need the first werking computers were dedicated to cryptography (is tasks. And the possibility that computer scale M^{-1} to perform tasks, the course of the scale of the course of Werking technology. Cryptography 10° and the computer scale M^{-1} to perform tasks, the first lead of the course excention technology of the course of the cour

The near unfamilier with direct of these fields may with to consult some of these relations are related one stabilishes for adoptional radius, it is the area of carlyography, there is the classic historical study of Kah [10], the survey papers of DBm and Histon (10), and Davia and Histon (10), and Davia and Histon (10). The David History and History (10), and Davia and History (10). The David History (10) and the davia of the david History (10) and the david History (10). The david History (10) and th

Machine learning and cryptanalysis can be viewed as "Sister fields," since they share many of the same notions and concerns. [...] ² Valiant notes that good cryptography can [...] provide examples of classes of functions that are hard to learn.

²R. Rivest, Machine Learning and Cryptography. In: ASIACRYPT'91, pp. 427–439

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[&]quot;Supported by NSF grant CCR-8914428, ARO grant N00014-89-J-1968, and the Siemens Corporation. email address: rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu

▶ ...

Key remark: Al goes way beyond machine learning!

- Symbolic AI
- Metaheuristics (evolutionary algorithms, ...)
- Natural Computing (cellular automata, ...)
- Statistical and non-statistical learning

Al has already been used extensively in crypto before the advent of deep learning

Al for Crypto:


- Al to support the design of cryptographic primitives
- Al to automate the attacks on cryptographic primitives

Crypto for AI:


- Use crypto techniques to secure AI models
- Use AI to detect/control AI models

Al for Crypto

Al Methods for Symmetric Cryptography



Symmetric ciphers require several low-level primitives, such as:




Generators

and S-boxes

Orthogonal Arrays


Al approach for symmetric crypto

- "Traditional" approach: ad-hoc and algebraic constructions
- "AI" approach [M22]: support the designer using AI methods
 - Optimization (Evolutionary algorithms, swarm intelligence...)



Computational models (cellular automata, neural networks...)







Genetic Algorithms (GA) & Genetic Programming (GP)

Black-box optimization of a fitness function [L15]

- Work on a coding of the solutions
- GA Encoding: bitstrings








Design of primitives as **combinatorial optimization problems**, examples [C21, M22]:

▶ Boolean functions $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2$ for stream ciphers




▶ S-Boxes $F : \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^m$ for block ciphers

Possible advantages of using EA for this search [?, M19b]:

- Diversity of solutions, due to the "blindness" of EA
- Flexibility of EA (optimizing several properties at once


One-dimensional Cellular AutomatA (CA):

Example: n = 6, d = 3, $f(s_i, s_{i+1}, s_{i+2}) = s_i \oplus s_{i+1} \oplus s_{i+2}$



► Each cell updates its state $s \in \{0, 1\}$ by applying a local rule $f : \{0, 1\}^d \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ to itself and the d - 1 cells on its right

Goal: investigate how CA can be used in the design of cryptographic primitives [W86, L13]




Why CA?

- 1. Security from Complexity
- 2. Efficient Implementation

Real world CA-Based Crypto: Keccak χ S-box

- Local rule: $\chi(x_1, x_2, x_3) = x_1 \oplus (1 \oplus (x_2 \cdot x_3))$ (rule 210)
- Invertible for every odd size n of the CA




Used as a PBCA with n = 5 in Keccak [B11]

CA S-boxes found by GP


Idea: evolve a CA rule that defines an S-box, optimizing:

- crypto properties (nonlinearity, differential uniformity) [M19a]
- implementation properties (area, latency)



Up to size 7×7: results on par or slightly better than the state of the art (Keccak, PRESENT, Piccolo, ...) [P17]


Evolving Constructions of Boolean functions with GP



- Idea: Do not evolve primitives directly, but rather their mathematical constructions [C22]
- Use Boolean minimizers to interpret the constructions
- Research Question: Does GP obtain previously known constructions or new ones?

Differential Cryptanalysis


Idea: chosen plaintext attack, see how differences propagate to the ciphertext



- ► **Goal**: Compute differential probability of $\Delta \rightarrow \Delta^*$
- Distinguishing attack: given (x, x'), classify if it is a random or real pair
- Tool: Difference Distribution Table (DDT)

Deep learning-based differential distinguishers

- A. Gohr (CRYPTO 2019): train a CNN as a differential distinguisher
- Better accuracy than pure distinguishers on SPECK32/64



Problem: learned models are hardly interpretable!


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³Image credits: A. Benamira et al., A Deeper Look at Machine Learning-Based Cryptanalysis, EUROCRYPT 2021

Open problem: interpretable AI-based distinguishers

Idea: Replace convolutional layers with convolutional GP [J21]



Research Question: Is "convolutional" GP able to reach CNN performances, and yield models easier to interpret?


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Crypto for Al

Adversarial Examples in DNN

DNN known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples (AE)

Idea: perturb a valid example to mess the DNN's classification



Classification: Panda

Noise perturbation

Classification: Gibbon

 Perturbation moves the example beyond the decision boundary of a DNN

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⁴Example credits: I.J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, C. Szegedy, *Explaining and Harnessing* Adversarial Examples, ICLR 2015

Evolutionary Construction of AE

- Perturbations for AE can be minimal
- One-pixel attack: Modify just one pixel in a valid example



Pixel selection done with Evolutionary Algorithms

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⁵Image credit: J. Su et al., *One Pixel Attack for Fooling Deep Neural Networks*. IEEE Trans. Evol. Comput 23(5):828-840 (2019)

Why do we want Adversarial robust networs?

- Better accuracy.
- Better explanation of the behavior of networks.

Adversarial Robustness:


Separating the *l*∞-balls requires a significantly more complicated decision boundary.



- Adversarial training
- Network Pruning
- Random input transformation
- Certified Robustness

Certified Robustness

- Most defenses are *empirical*.
- Certified robustness provides theoretical guarantees.




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⁶Li Linyi et al. "Sok: Certified robustness for deep neural networks." arXiv preprint arXiv:2009.04131 (2020).

Differential Privacy

Idea: anonymize the query mechanism, rather than the database itself



 Key property: an adversary has a negligible probability of distinguishing two DBs differing in only one row

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⁷Image credits: N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, Privacy and machine learning: two unexpected allies?

Differential Privacy

Ingredients:

- Randomized algorithm A
- Database D
- Output space O

Definition: Differential Privacy


A is (ϵ, δ) -DP wrt a metric ρ on *D* if for any *D'* such that $\rho(D, D') \leq 1$ and $S \subseteq O$, it holds:

$$P(A(D) \in S) \le e^{\epsilon}P(A(D') \in S) + \delta$$
.

• ϵ, δ : privacy strength parameters (small)


• ρ : usually the Hamming distance

- How is A implemented?
- Addition of noise drawn from specific distribution
- Usual choice: Laplace noise $L(\mu, b)$



PixelDP Architecture (Lecuyér et al. 2019)

- Trick: input image x is a "DB", where each row is e.g. a pixel
- Randomized A: output scores (y₁(x),...,y_k(x)) (e.g. given by an activation function like SoftMax)
- Noise added after the first layer at inference time



⁸M. Lecuyér et al.: Certified Robustness to Adversarial Examples with Differential Privacy. IEEE S&P 2019

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Conclusions

Where we arrived so far:

- Al methods have extensively been used in crypto, both for design and analysis of primitives
- Cryptographic-like techniques can help in making AI models more robust

Looking at the future:

- Plenty of open problems for the "Crypto for AI" direction!
- Statistical watermarking of LLMs (Aaronson, 2023)
- Cryptographic backdoors in NN (Goldwasser et al., 2022)

Thank you!



https://aicrypt2024.aisylab.com/

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